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We acknowledge the potential for abuse when a defendant may 
be subjected to repeated punitive damage awards arising out of 
the same conduct. Yet, like the many other courts which have 
addressed the problem, we are unable to devise a fair and effec-
tive solution.  
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters1  
INTRODUCTION 
 Damages can add up to super-punitive amounts in unin-
tended ways. To take a textbook example: The Defendant has 
caused an industrial accident or other mass tort. Plaintiff 1 
sues, winning punitive damages based on the reprehensibility 
of that original act. Plaintiff 2 also sues—and also wins puni-
tive damages on the same grounds. So do Plaintiff 3, Plaintiff 4, 
and so forth.2 If each of these punitive awards is directed at the 
same general badness of that original act, then these punish-
ments are redundant.3 When such redundancy occurs, even 
	
1 638 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. 1994).	
2 To anticipate some of the analysis yet to come: Existing legal solutions 
for such a situation are widely seen as haphazard and inadequate. See infra 
Part I. Of special note is the asymmetry in preclusion law, which cannot 
block such redundancy (because the plaintiffs are not parties in each other’s 
cases)—and may very well aggravate it (if the plaintiffs are able to use 
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel against the defendant). See, e.g., 
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884–85 (2008) (holding that nonparties can-
not be bound by the preclusive effect of past judgments or findings, except 
under limited conditions); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 
(1979) (endorsing the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel). 
Meanwhile, aggregation devices (such as the mandatory punitive damages 
class action) that might serve as occasional discouragements to redundant 
awards have fallen into disfavor. For a fuller analysis, see infra Part I.	
3 The potential for redundancy can also be described, of course, in terms 
of overdeterrence rather than duplicative retribution. (The commonly ad-
vanced—and often conflicting—conceptual aims of punitive damages will 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2495823 
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damages that are meant to be punitive can reach surprisingly 
punitive levels.4 
This Essay addresses two distinct ways in which unexpect-
edly excessive damages may arise. The first and more straight-
forward problem is redundant punitive damages, as in the 
scenario above.5 The second and more subtle problem is what 
	
be considered in more detail in Part I.) For instance, overdeterrence will ob-
viously occur if the punitive damages award in every individual plaintiff’s 
case is set at the fully deterrent amount, and multiple plaintiffs win this 
amount. The need to avoid overdeterrence is clear when the aim of dam-
ages is assumed to be “optimal deterrence” (that is, forcing actors to inter-
nalize the full social costs of their conduct). But avoiding overdeterrence is 
also useful when the assumed aim is “absolute deterrence” (that is, erasing 
all private gains to the actor from the conduct, in order to reduce the activ-
ity level to zero); the most familiar reason is a need to avoid distorting mar-
ginal deterrence. See George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 
78 J. Pol. Econ. 526, 527 (1970) (“If the offender will be executed for a minor 
assault and for a murder, there is no marginal deterrence to murder.”).	
4 Courts and commentators have given this problem various names, in-
cluding “successive” or “multiple” punitive damages—or simply the “mul-
tiple punishments problem.” See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Camp-
bell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) (noting “the possibility of multiple punitive 
damages awards for the same conduct”); Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385 
(3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (“successive punitive damages awards”); Thomas B. 
Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as 
Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 583 (2003); 
Jim Gash, Solving the Multiple Punishments Problem: A Call for a National 
Punitive Damages Registry, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1613 (2005); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 428 
(2003) (“multiple punishments”).	
5 More complicated variations of this simplified initial scenario are ad-
dressed in Part I. Note that rather than calling the problem “multiple” or 
“successive” punishment, I favor the term “redundant” in part to recognize 
that not all repetitions of punitive damages are excessive. Multiple awards 
of punitive damages may well be necessary (and thus not redundant) to 
reach the proper level of deterrence or retribution for a given act by a de-
fendant; this might be especially true given the current state of constitu-
tional constraints on the sizes of awards. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 
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we might call the “hyper-enforcement” of statutory damages: 
when successful enforcement in fact occurs more frequently 
than is implicitly assumed in the statutory scheme (with 
awards preset at super-compensatory levels to make up for 
some expected degree of underenforcement). The result there 
is that damages not meant to be punitive can nonetheless stack 
up to punishing effect, most famously when thousands or mil-
lions of claims are aggregated. Both problems are classic con-
cerns that have defied tidy resolution despite decades of anx-
ious recognition by courts and commentators.6 
These two classes of problems are united by a central feature 
that has yet to receive conceptual articulation: In each context, 
the damages a defendant should pay for a single bad act con-
tain both a “variable” component (which properly varies with 
the number of victims or nominal counts), as well as a “fixed” 
component (which should be awarded only once for the given 
act).7 The crucial mistake that can lead to surprisingly punitive 
damages in each context is repeatedly awarding the “fixed” 
portion along with the “variable” portion when multiple 
awards are based on the same underlying act. 
A procedural solution for neutralizing such redundancy is 
readily suggested by this conceptual framing: allow courts to 
	
(warning that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive 
and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due proc-
ess”). Such crude constraints, of course, do not generally prevent the repeti-
tion of punitive damages from reaching the point of redundancy.	
6 The first problem is indeed a textbook example of redundancy—and of 
courts expressing helplessness given the current state of the law. See Mark 
A. Franklin, Robert L. Rabin & Michael D. Green, Tort Law and Alterna-
tives 774 (9th ed. 2011). Part I elaborates on this problem. For examples of 
commentary on the second problem, see Section II.A.	
7 Alternatively, for a single course of conduct that involves many acts, the 
“variable” component is the amount that should vary with the number of 
acts, and the “fixed” component is the amount that should be awarded only 
once for that single course of conduct. 	
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run concurrently the “fixed” component of these repeated 
awards. This Essay explains how it can be applied to each of 
the two classes of problems. In earlier work, I have illustrated 
how the use of concurrent damages can repair the gross inac-
curacies that occur when statutory damages awards are blindly 
pegged to a nominal count of violations rather than to the con-
duct’s real effects.8 Here, the focus shifts to a more complicated 
form of redundancy in damages, and thus to a more nuanced 
use of concurrent damages: The court should identify the por-
tion of each damages award that would be redundant if re-
peated in other awards (in the same case or in other cases) and 
then designate that portion to run concurrently with the other 
awards. 
Part I will explore how courts can apply this solution to the 
first problem, that of punitive damages being redundantly 
awarded to multiple plaintiffs for the same original act. In one 
basic approach, a court might view compensatory damages as 
the “variable” component and punitive damages as the “fixed” 
component of its award. On this view, the court would run 
(only) its punitive damages concurrently with those awarded 
by other courts.  
Refinements to this baseline method may be needed, how-
ever, depending on what the court assumes the purpose of pu-
nitive damages to be, on how many individual punitive dam-
ages awards are needed to serve that purpose, on whether the 
court takes a defendant- or plaintiff-focused view of punitive 
damages, and on whether the court is allowed to use concur-
rence in anticipation of future awards (as is possible in concur-
rent criminal sentencing9). These variations are analyzed in 
	
8 Bert I. Huang, Concurrent Damages, 100 Va. L. Rev. 711 (2014).	
9 See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1473 (2012) (endorsing the 
power of federal courts to run criminal sentences either consecutively or 
concurrently with anticipated but yet-to-be-adjudicated state criminal sen-
tences for the same conduct).	
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Part I, along with the general procedural advantages of the 
concurrent damages solution. 
Part II will turn to the statutory damages problem. Statutory 
damages are often said to be set at super-compensatory levels, 
based on the premise that enforcement will be imperfect, that 
proof will be difficult, or that private suits will need extra in-
ducement. But such an understanding also implies that when-
ever successful enforcement is more likely than assumed in the 
original statutory design, the resulting expected damages will 
be overly deterrent. 
Two variants of this hyper-enforcement problem will be ad-
dressed, along with heuristics for using concurrent damages as 
a corrective for each. The first variant occurs when higher 
counts of violations attract more enforcement attention or 
more avid plaintiffs, or lead to easier detection or proof. 
A second variant arises due to minimum statutory per-count 
awards that are set at high levels to encourage individual 
plaintiffs to sue on claims that would otherwise be too small to 
be worth litigating. The problem is that beyond a certain 
threshold, there is no longer any need for such subsidies to 
continue accumulating with every count.10 And where thou-
sands or even millions of counts can be claimed or aggregated 
in a given case, the redundant accumulation of these induce-
ments to sue can reach astonishing sums.11 
Finally, the Conclusion will propose a thought experiment 
that highlights both limitations and possible extensions of the 
present analysis: What if these sorts of excessive damages are 
	
10 The desired litigation subsidy may thus be understood as the “fixed” 
component of the damages scheme, in such a case.	
11 Most famous may be the flurry of class actions under the Fair and Accu-
rate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, 
based on errors in printing customer receipts—such as the suit against 
Chuck E. Cheese restaurants with claims potentially amounting to $1.9 bil-
lion. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 	
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not “surprises” at all, but instead are messages aimed at deter-
ring overconfident actors who think they are more likely to 
evade enforcement than they really are?12 Is “acoustic separa-
tion” then useful, or even necessary, for the practical applica-
tion of concurrent damages? 
I. REDUNDANT PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
“Overkill” is what Judge Henry Friendly famously called 
it—and yet he could point to no general solution to the poten-
tially “staggering” problem of redundant punitive damages.13 
The courts have not had better luck in the forty years since.14 
Neither has Congress.15 The concern seems to have motivated 
	
12 The analysis thus emphasizes the essential point that perceptions—
including misperceptions—are what matter for ex ante incentives. 	
13 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(“We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive 
damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so 
administered as to avoid overkill. . . . We know of no principle whereby the 
first punitive award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and would 
thus preclude future judgments . . . .”). 	
14 This is not for any lack of concern or notice of the problem. See, e.g., 
Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1385 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) (“[T]he point of 
‘overkill’ has been reached with respect to punitive damages in asbestos 
litigation.”). Indeed, judges have long warned of potential constitutional 
implications. See, e.g., Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir. 
1989) (noting that “the multiple imposition of punitive damages for the 
same course of conduct may raise serious constitutional concerns”); In re 
Fed. Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1188 (8th Cir. 1982) (“Unlimited multi-
ple punishment for the same act determined in a succession of individual 
lawsuits and bearing no relation to the defendants’ culpability or the actual 
injuries suffered by victims, would violate the sense of ‘fundamental fair-
ness’ that is essential to constitutional due process.”). But the U.S. Supreme 
Court has yet to address the issue directly. See infra note 17. 	
15 Two attempts in the Senate failed in committee. See Multiple Punitive 
Damages Fairness Act of 1995, S. 671, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by 
Senator Orrin Hatch); Multiple Punitive Damages Fairness Act of 1997, S. 
78, 105th Cong. (1997) (re-introduced by Senator Hatch). 	
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the U.S. Supreme Court in developing its due process limita-
tions,16 and yet the Court has also studiously avoided confront-
ing the problem head-on.17 A few states have devised a mixed 
bag of constraints, such as offsets or flat bans on later awards, 
but there has been little coherence among their approaches.18 
A. Concurrent Damages as a Solution 
The concurrent damages approach offers the hope of an ana-
lytically coherent solution. At least, it offers a clear conceptual 
frame for understanding what any fix for the problem should 
aspire to do. As an initial exploration, the following analysis 
will sketch the starting principles for running punitive dam-
ages concurrently, note some potential advantages and obsta-
cles, and touch on how concurrence relates to other procedural 
devices (such as preclusion and aggregation). The analysis will 
focus on how to extract the right amount of punitive damages 
from the defendant and not on how that windfall should be 
	
16 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 
(2003) (noting the problem of multiple punitive damages awards). 	
17 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 612 n.4 (1996) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court declines “to address the question of 
multiple punitive damages awards stemming from the same alleged mis-
conduct”). The Court’s latest guidance in Philip Morris USA v. Williams 
seems to inch closer to the problem: Juries are not to punish the defendant 
for harms done to non-parties—and yet they may still consider such non-
party harms in judging the act’s reprehensibility when assessing punitive 
damages. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353–55 (2007). But 
this guidance cannot bar the redundancy that occurs when each jury 
awards its own plaintiff for the inherent reprehensibility of the act (as sup-
posed in the initial illustration above). Moreover, the case provides cover 
for jury awards that do count harms to others under the rubric of reprehen-
sibility. 	
18 On the relative virtues and shortcomings of such approaches, see infra 
note 46 and accompanying text.	
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given out to plaintiffs,19 though it will make note of various ju-
dicial approaches already in use for allocating a single award 
among multiple claimants. Other important considerations—
such as how the concept of concurrence may be put to work in 
the context of repeated settlements20—are reserved for future 
analysis.21 
	
19 How punitive damages are allocated among plaintiffs is a secondary 
concern, conceptually, under the modern view that punitive damages are 
defendant-focused rather than plaintiff-focused. Punitive damages are now 
generally understood to be a windfall for (rather than an entitlement of) 
plaintiffs—a view reflected in split-recovery statutes that divert a large 
share of punitive damages away from the winning plaintiff and into the 
state treasury or to charitable uses. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 
U.S. 471, 492 (2008) (“Regardless of the alternative rationales over the years, 
the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but 
principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Sharkey, supra 
note 4, at 370–80. This distinction may be blurred in those cases where pu-
nitive damages as a practical matter serve to make up for gaps in compen-
sation or serve as an inducement to bring suit. Although such circum-
stances are omitted from the present analysis, needless to say, they would 
not generally justify awarding exactly the full measure of punitive damages 
to every plaintiff. Moreover, creating a concurrence option at least allows 
the judge to make the call in any case involving such a tradeoff—between 
reducing lawsuits or undercompensating, on the one hand, and overdeter-
ring or overpunishing, on the other—as opposed to automatically default-
ing in favor of the latter. It should also be noted that, whenever it may be 
useful for more than one plaintiff to receive some amount of punitive dam-
ages, the concurrent damages option (which allows the possibility that pu-
nitive damages will be shared among plaintiffs) is superior to the first-
come, first-served approach used in some states, which permits an award of 
punitive damages to only the first plaintiff. See infra notes 41–46 and ac-
companying text.	
20 For a recent illustration of taking a prior settlement into account in as-
sessing later fines and penalties—in effect running them concurrently—see 
the Justice Department’s plea agreement with SAC Management. Press Re-
lease, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea 
Agreement with SAC Capital Management Companies (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November13/
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1. “Fixed” and “Variable” Damages 
One simple principle should guide the use of concurrent pu-
nitive damages: If a judge believes that some portion of the to-
tal damages in a case before him reflects an amount that this 
defendant should not be made to pay repeatedly, then he 
should designate this portion to run concurrently with the 
awards in other cases. To use the vocabulary introduced ear-
lier, the judge should distinguish between the “fixed” and 
“variable” components of the total award in that case—in ef-
fect allowing only the variable component to be repeated in 
other cases, by running the fixed component concurrently. 
Consider this most basic of possible scenarios (call it Sce-
nario 1): Suppose that the judge views the punitive damages in 
the case as representing full legal retribution for the defen-
	
SACPleaPR.php (“Because the SAC Companies have already agreed to pay 
$616 million to the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to resolve re-
lated civil insider trading charges, that amount will be credited against to-
day’s penalty [of $1.8 billion], and therefore, the additional payment re-
quired under this Agreement will be approximately $1.2 billion.”).	
21 It may be worth noting here, however incompletely, three starting 
points for the analysis of settlements. First, the use of concurrence (or not) 
by the courts in determining punitive damages awards will presumably 
cast the shadow in which settlements are negotiated. Second, as a general 
matter, settlements already must specify the scope of the defendants’ con-
duct for which liability is being released. Thus the question is not whether 
that information must be generated, but whether it is kept confidential be-
tween the settling parties—and if anything, one might expect the attractive 
prospect of later courts running their awards concurrently with past settle-
ments to induce defendants to publicize the scope of conduct covered by 
those settlements. Third, the implementation mechanics of distributing 
funds from a settlement to future judgments (or future settlements) would 
not be entirely new problems, as solutions have already been developed in 
some contexts. See, e.g., In re Carolina Tobacco Co., 360 B.R. 702, 706–07 (D. 
Or. 2007) (describing the escrow account required by a settlement with 
states for the payment of future judgment awards).	
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dant’s entire course of conduct. He would then run the whole 
of the punitive award concurrently with those in other cases. 
The following refinements to this prototype approach illus-
trate how the use of concurrent damages can be adapted to 
varying circumstances: first, under competing theories about 
the purpose of punitive damages; second, along the spectrum 
of views of punitive damages, from defendant-focused to 
plaintiff-focused; and third, when courts are able or unable to 
run damages concurrently with future awards. 
2. Differing Aims of Punitive Damages 
The consensus modern view is that punitive damages serve 
a dual function—retribution and deterrence.22 Yet these aims 
do not always align. The amount needed for retribution may 
not be equal to what is needed to deter. Nor is there always 
agreement on what each term means, and one might sensibly 
think that the best meaning should vary by context. Consider 
the question of what amount is needed to “deter”: Does that 
refer to what is conventionally called optimal deterrence (that 
is, loss internalization)? Or rather, to absolute deterrence (that 
is, erasing any gains from the misconduct)?23 Or to still some 
other understanding of deterrence? 
	
22 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 492 (2008) (“Re-
gardless of the alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is 
that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution 
and deterring harmful conduct.”); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a 
State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its 
repetition.”).	
23 It should be emphasized that for both the optimal deterrence and abso-
lute deterrence approaches, accuracy in damages is useful—not least be-
cause of the familiar need to set marginal deterrence correctly. See Stigler, 
supra note 3.	
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Fortunately, the general usefulness of concurrence in reduc-
ing redundancy does not much depend on any particular an-
swer to these questions. Yet in operation variations do arise 
depending on which purpose is assumed, because it affects the 
question of what portion of damages is understood to be the 
“fixed” component that should run concurrently across cases. 
As a practical matter, the importance of these variations may 
well be washed out by the rough-justice nature of assigning 
monetary damages, and especially punitive damages, in the 
first place. But it is still useful for the sake of conceptual clarity 
to point them out. 
Deterrence versus retribution. — First, consider the distinction 
between the dual aims. How might a court focused on deter-
rence (whether optimal or absolute) differ from a retribution-
oriented court in deciding which portion of the damages 
award to designate as running concurrently? One critical dif-
ference is the role of compensatory damages. A judge taking a 
retributive approach may view them as irrelevant to punish-
ment (as we have assumed in Scenario 1 above). By contrast, 
the degree of deterrence depends on the total award, including 
compensatory damages.24 
Thus a judge who believes she has achieved the full measure 
of deterrence, via the total damages in the case before her, 
would not want any of that amount to be revisited on this same 
defendant (for the same conduct) by other courts. The sum of 
the compensatory and punitive damages in this case alone is 
all the deterrence that the judge thinks is needed. The court 
may well have reached this result by using punitive damages 
to make up the difference between the compensatory damages 
	
24 This is true under both the loss-internalization (optimal deterrence) and 
the gains-erasing (absolute deterrence) views. Compensatory damages are 
more closely related to the former, for obvious reasons. But under either 
view they should be recognized as part of the total costs to the defendant, 
and thus part of the deterrent.	
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and the desired deterrent amount. In essence, the “fixed” com-
ponent of damages here is the entire award. 
What this deterrence-oriented judge should run concur-
rently, in theory, are the total damages (not only the punitive 
damages). But in practice, she cannot do so. She must actually 
award the compensatory damages in the present case. So the 
best she can do is to say that the punitive damages are to run 
concurrently. At this point, she may seem to be acting identi-
cally to the retribution-oriented judge in Scenario 1. But here is 
the crucial difference: The deterrence-oriented judge should 
run the punitive damages in this case concurrently with not 
only the punitive damages in other cases, but with any dam-
ages in other cases, including those that are compensatory. 
Note that although this approach minimizes overdeterrence, 
there may still be some slippage—if courts can only run their 
damages concurrently with past awards. Suppose that the first 
court awards damages in the fully deterrent amount. Then the 
best that the second court can do is to run its own punitive 
damages award concurrently with the total damages in the first 
case. Because the defendant will also pay the compensatory 
damages in this second case, the defendant ends up overpay-
ing relative to the accurately deterrent amount (though this re-
dundancy is far less than without concurrence).25 This struc-
tural feature, that a court cannot designate its own 
compensatory damages to run concurrently, is a complication 
for the deterrence approach—but not for the retribution ap-
proach assumed in Scenario 1. 
Shared and individual components of retribution. — Next, let us 
consider how courts focused on only one of the dual aims, ret-
ribution, might nonetheless vary in their ideal use of concur-
	
25 As we shall see, reducing or avoiding such slippage may be possible if 
the courts can also run damages concurrently with future awards. See infra 
Subsection I.A.3.	
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rence. Imagine a variation on Scenario 1: What if a judge does 
not view the punitive damages in her case as reflecting the full 
legal retribution this defendant should have to face, and so she 
believes that further punitive damages in other cases may be 
warranted (to some extent)? For instance, she might see her 
role as assigning punitive damages to serve retribution on be-
half of this specific plaintiff, but not on behalf of other vic-
tims.26 
She might then conceive of this plaintiff’s total punitive 
damages as having two parts: One portion serves the aim of 
retribution for the defendant’s reprehensibility as directed only 
at this specific plaintiff. She may well expect other judges to 
award such a portion to their plaintiffs as well. She would 
view these per-plaintiff portions not as redundant, but as a 
“variable” component of punitive damages and thus properly 
cumulative across cases. 
Meanwhile, she may see a separate portion of this plaintiff’s 
punitive damages as serving the aim of retribution for the in-
herent, general badness of the defendant’s conduct (from 
which this plaintiff also suffered)—the “fixed” quantum of 
reprehensibility shared among the victims, punishable by a 
one-time levy against the defendant. This portion of the pun-
ishment would be redundant if other courts also awarded it. 
(And yet at least one court must mete out this part of the pun-
ishment.) Because retribution on behalf of any plaintiff would 
be incomplete without this component, each court’s award 
should include it.27 But then each court should also run this 
	
26 The judge would thus be acting in the spirit of Philip Morris, discussed 
supra note 17.	
27 Note again that including such a shared component of reprehensibility 
would not likely run afoul of Philip Morris (as discussed supra note 17) be-
cause it is properly part of the punishment for this plaintiff’s harm—just as 
it would be for any other plaintiff.	
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
   15 
portion of the punitive award (and only this portion) concur-
rently with the awards in other cases. 
The usual principle thus still applies, but now the “fixed” 
portion is only a subset of the punitive damages in each indi-
vidual case. The narrower point here is that the portion of the 
damages a court runs concurrently need not always be the full 
punitive damages award.28  
The more general point is that concurrence is an option, not a 
command. Its use can be flexibly adapted to understandings of 
punitive damages that vary from judge to judge, or from situa-
tion to situation.29 
3. Anticipation of Future Awards 
Should the concurrence device be only backward-looking, 
with later courts running their new awards concurrently with 
past awards? Or should it be used even by earlier courts, in a 
forward-looking way, as is possible with concurrent criminal 
sentencing?30 There is no conceptual reason that concurrence 
cannot be used in anticipation of future awards—and there are 
good practical reasons to encourage such use. Concurrence is a 
more powerful, and more user-friendly, tool when it can be 
used by earlier courts as well as by later courts. 
Think again of the deterrence-focused judges described 
above, who are hamstrung by not being able to run compensa-
tory damages concurrently. If concurrence is only backward-
looking, then even if all punitive damages run concurrently, 
	
28 The chosen subset may be of any size, of course: At one extreme, the 
“subset” may be as large as all of the punitive damages (as it was in Sce-
nario 1 above). At the other extreme, it may be a null set, in which case the 
judge forgoes concurrence altogether. 	
29 The complications that can arise when successive judges (dealing with 
the same conduct) disagree about the use of concurrence will be explored in 
the next section.  
30 See, e.g., Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463 (2012).	
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the compensatory damages will continue to accumulate case 
by case—each time causing the defendant to overpay further 
beyond the fully deterrent amount. 
But notice how the problem dissipates if concurrence can be 
used in a forward-looking, anticipatory way. In the first case, 
the judge announces that the punitive damages award is to run 
concurrently with any past or future damages (both compensa-
tory and punitive) for the same course of conduct.31 The task 
for the second judge is identical, and so forth for each later 
court. As successive cases occur, their formal punitive awards 
not only run concurrently with each other—but also partially 
or fully absorb the accumulation of compensatory damages. 
To illustrate, consider a defendant who causes identical 
harms to Plaintiffs 1 through 5. Suppose that for this act, the 
courts adopt an optimal deterrence purpose for punitive dam-
ages. The courts are (collectively) aiming for full loss internali-
zation; that is, aggregate damages should total five times the 
individual harm. Court 1 achieves this optimal deterrence 
amount by awarding compensatory damages (one times the 
harm) and makes up the rest using punitive damages (four 
times the harm). Suppose Court 2 does the same. 
Imagine if Court 1 can run its punitive damages concur-
rently with future damages, including Court 2’s compensatory 
damages. Now both Court 1 and Court 2 can simply say, “My 
punitive damages run concurrently with any past or future 
damages in any other cases.” First the defendant will pay one 
measure of harm to each of Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 2 (as com-
pensatory damages). Suppose the defendant then pays three 
further measures of harm to Plaintiff 1, as punitive damages. 
Now, Court 2’s punitive damages award is also satisfied via 
	
31 By doing so, the first judge has in effect solved the next judge’s problem 
of not being able to declare that compensatory damages are to run concur-
rently (because the first judge has already made that happen).	
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concurrence, because those four measures of harm have been 
paid to Plaintiff 1. At the same time, Court 1’s punitive dam-
ages award is also fully satisfied, because three measures of it 
have been directly paid to Plaintiff 1, and one measure is run-
ning concurrently with Plaintiff 2’s compensatory damages.32 
(The logic works just as well if any or all of the three extra 
measures of harm are paid to Plaintiff 2 instead.) 
The defendant has thus discharged his liability upon paying 
five times the harm, as desired. At the same time, the defen-
dant cannot satisfy both courts’ awards by paying any less. 
Moreover, further judgments (by Courts 3, 4, and 5) are simi-
larly absorbed; in particular, the compensatory damages that 
must be paid to those plaintiffs are credited to the punitive 
damages of the other courts, and again the defendant will not 
ever pay more (nor can it get away with paying less) than the 
optimal amount of five times the harm. 
The illustration above shows how the use of anticipatory 
concurrence can mitigate the slippage problem noted above. 
More importantly, it highlights an approach in which each 
court need only follow a simple heuristic, one that relieves 
them of needing to know how many other courts are giving 
awards, and how much those awards might be. Unlike other 
possible anticipatory adjustments (such as reducing damages 
in an earlier case based on a prediction that later cases will 
arise), no such guesswork is needed here: A court need only 
declare that its awards are to run concurrently with any past or 
future awards. 
Allocating among plaintiffs. — There is a tradeoff to such sim-
plicity at the adjudication stage, however, in that the courts 
	
32 In contrast, if concurrence is only possible in a backward-looking way, 
then Court 2 would run its punitive damages concurrently with Court 1’s 
damages award; but the compensatory damages in Court 2 would push the 
defendant’s payments from the optimal deterrence amount of five times 
harm up to six times harm (and so forth for each further case).	
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
18    
will then need to make practical determinations about how to 
allocate the concurrent amount among the plaintiffs who do 
materialize. Allocation of this sort is a familiar (if not always 
an easy) task for the courts. For instance, think of bankruptcy 
proceedings, “contribution” among joint tortfeasors, or any 
case involving multiple plaintiffs sharing a “limited fund.” 
One might even think of such allocation among plaintiffs as a 
sort of joint-and-several recovery. 
These analogies suggest two points: First, in the present con-
text there is arguably less at stake in precisely how the concur-
rent amount is allocated than in the other settings. The reason 
is that punitive damages are generally understood to be the 
penalty the defendant deserves to pay, not compensation that 
plaintiffs deserve to receive;33 this is perhaps best illustrated by 
“split-recovery” statutes that reallocate a large share of puni-
tive damages away from winning plaintiffs to the state treas-
ury or to charitable funds.34 Second, as a technical matter, the 
various devices that the courts have used to serve these other 
allocation needs—such as escrows or trusts, equitable alloca-
tion principles, or time limits for further plaintiffs to come 
forward—may be adaptable to the distribution of the concur-
rent award.35 For example: Court 1 can require the defendant 
	
33 See supra note 19. 
34 See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2–1207 (2012); Iowa Code § 668A.1(2)(b) 
(2013); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.735 (West 2013). For further analysis of such 
“split-recovery” statutes, see Sharkey, supra note 4, at 375–80.	
35 See, e.g., Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1394 (3d Cir. 1993) (en banc) 
(Weis, J., dissenting) (observing that in another case, “[t]he district court in-
tervened to impose measures for a more equitable distribution of the funds 
and eventually approved an arrangement that altered the distribution proc-
ess so that those most seriously injured were paid first. In addition, a seri-
ous attempt was made to predict future claims so that present and future 
claimants would be paid an equitable percentage of their claims’ value.” (ci-
tations omitted)). Courts have used escrow accounts for the payment of fu-
ture judgment awards. See, e.g., In re Carolina Tobacco Co., 360 B.R. 702, 
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to pay Plaintiff 1 her compensatory award immediately, but set 
aside funds in escrow or trust for the punitive award, on the 
understanding that Plaintiff 1 will be paid an equitable share of 
those reserved funds after a fixed time period (a share that de-
pends on how many other plaintiffs have won punitive dam-
ages in that time).36 Court 2 can then require that some or all of 
the payment to Plaintiff 2 come from that initial escrow or trust 
(which Court 1 will allow because that is the very point of set-
ting up such a fund), or Court 1 can release an appropriate 
amount of the reserved funds back to the defendant, based on 
the amount the defendant verifies it has directly paid to Plain-
tiff 2.37 
	
706–07 (D. Or. 2007) (describing escrow account required by a settlement 
with states for the payment of future judgment awards). Courts have also 
used trusts to collect and distribute punitive damages awards. See, e.g., 
Sampson v. Vasey, No. LA28882, 2007 WL 4555839, at *1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 
Sept. 4, 2007) (“[T]he punitive damages shall be deposited into the plain-
tiff’s attorney’s trust account for distribution after reduction of attorney fees 
and a proportionate share of the out of pocket costs of recovery with 25% of 
the gross recovery of punitive damages to the Plaintiff and the remainder 
paid into the civil reparations trust fund.” (citing Fernandez v. Curley, 463 
N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1990) regarding Iowa’s split-recovery statute)); Payne v. 
Cmty. Blood Ctr., No. 0210-10211, 2004 WL 5400536, at *3 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 
25, 2004) (“[T]he Court notes that allegations of punitive damages remain 
pending against Defendant Cryolife, Inc., and that both compensatory and 
punitive damages may, at some future time, be deposited into the Trust.”). 	
36 It will likely be in the defendant’s interest to inform Court 1 of any 
other future potential punitive damages awards (and future claimants) it 
may face for the same conduct once Court 1 has decided on the amount of 
punitive damages and is considering whether to run them concurrently. 	
37 To be clear, each plaintiff will receive its full compensatory damages. 
But beyond that, how much of the remaining windfall goes to Plaintiff 1 
and how much goes to Plaintiff 2 can be guided by any equities in play. As 
a practical matter, such equities may be weighed by the fund administrator, 
as is commonly done in distributing a “limited fund” or class-wide dam-
ages. The possibility of allocating among plaintiffs based on the equities—
rather than based on factors such as who won the race to the courthouse—
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When courts disagree. — A conceptually more important 
complication is that successive courts may disagree about 
whether the punitive awards (or how much of the awards) 
should run concurrently, in the first place. The mechanism il-
lustrated above may seem to favor the courts that do think the 
award should run concurrently, in that a court always has the 
power to unilaterally reduce how much the defendant pays to 
that particular plaintiff (with the compensatory amount as the 
presumptive floor) but cannot require another court to award 
more. For example, Court 2 may decide to run its punitive 
damages award concurrently with that assessed by Court 1. 
But, assuming it does not manipulatively overinflate its own 
award, Court 2 cannot undo Court 1’s decision to run punitive 
damages concurrently with later awards. The influence of 
Court 1 is also limited, however: Undermining Court 1’s inten-
tions (in favor of those courts that think the punitive awards 
should accumulate) is still possible if more courts decline to run 
their awards concurrently. The reason is that Court 1’s use of 
concurrence can only effectively discount future awards by the 
amount of punitive damages that Court 1 itself has assessed. 
Extending this logic further, then, one might see the end result 
of the successive courts’ independent decisions about concur-
rence to be, loosely speaking, a sort of weighted average of 
their choices.38 
	
may be seen as a further advantage of the concurrence option over the al-
ternative devices noted in Subsection I.B.2.	
38 To extend the earlier illustration: If Courts 1, 2, 3, and 4 all run their 
awards concurrently as before but Court 5 refuses to do so, then the defen-
dant will end up paying nine (as opposed to five) measures of individual 
harm; this is still less than the multiplier of 25 that would occur in the ab-
sence of a concurrence option. 
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
   21 
B. Procedural Advantages 
This section will highlight a few procedural advantages of 
using the concurrent punitive damages device. The wellspring 
of these advantages is the conceptual integrity of this ap-
proach: Concurrence is not an ad hoc adjustment or judicial 
“fudging” (in contrast to preemptive reductions of earlier 
awards or complete bars on later awards). Quite the opposite. 
The concurrence mechanism neatly suits the reality of the over-
lapping enforcement problem: When there are concurrent en-
forcers, isn’t the most natural solution just to give concurrent 
awards? 
1. Information Costs 
Think back to this salutary aspect of using anticipatory con-
currence: Hardly any anticipation is needed at all. The court 
need not be aware of other cases addressing the same con-
duct—much less of whether those cases have resulted (or will 
result) in awards of any given size. Court 1 does not even need 
to know that it is Court 1, and Court 2 does not need to know 
that it is Court 2.39 
This feature speaks to a more general advantage of the con-
currence approach: Each court can determine its own award as 
if it had the only case against this defendant. Each can simply 
declare the full amount of punishment deserved, on behalf of 
its plaintiff. Notably, such undiminished declarations may also 
serve the public notice and socially expressive aims of allowing 
	
39 Note again, however, that as a practical matter the defendant will have 
good reason to inform Court 1 about the possibility of future punitive dam-
ages in Court 2, once Court 1 has decided to award punitive damages. 
Likewise, if Court 2 imposes punitive damages and is considering running 
them concurrently, the defendant will want to inform Court 2 about the 
penalty it already faces in Court 1. 	
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
22    
each court, in each jurisdiction and in each plaintiff’s case, to 
mark its own condemnation of the act. 
The practical upshot is that the information demands on the 
courts are lightened in setting their awards: No court needs to 
figure out how much to remit its award because another court 
has given (or might yet give) punishment for the same act.40 It 
also does not matter how many other such cases there will be. 
A corollary is that Court 1 then has no need to predict whether 
its outcome will encourage future lawsuits in Courts 2, 3, or 4. 
2. Anti-gaming and Robustness 
For similar reasons, the concurrence approach is also “ro-
bust” to later changes in other courts’ awards. This is a poten-
tial advantage over the alternative solution of barring subse-
quent awards. Suppose that a given state bars Plaintiff 2 from 
seeking punitive damages because an earlier case has already 
awarded them to Plaintiff 1.41 But what if Plaintiff 1’s award is 
later reduced or overturned on appeal? Plaintiff 2’s award 
cannot then be increased, unless that case can be reopened for 
new proceedings on damages, and so the defendant may well 
gain a windfall. 
The use of concurrent damages, by contrast, can avoid such 
a lapse in punishment and deterrence because Plaintiff 2’s 
	
40 By contrast, under a forward-looking scheme like Minnesota’s, Court 1 
must speculate as to what subsequent courts might do because punitive 
damages in the present case are to be assessed (and thus pre-adjusted) with 
an eye toward “the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed 
upon the defendant.” Minn. Stat. § 549.20 subdiv. 3 (2012). 	
41 This can occur in first-come, first-served states such as Florida. See Fla. 
Stat. § 768.73(2)(a) (2013) (“[P]unitive damages may not be awarded against 
a defendant in a civil action if that defendant establishes . . . that punitive 
damages have previously been awarded against that defendant in any state 
or federal court in any action alleging harm from the same act or single 
course of conduct for which the claimant seeks compensatory damages.”). 	
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formal award will have already been declared in full. No mat-
ter what happens to Plaintiff 1’s punitive award, the defendant 
remains on the hook for at least the amount announced for 
Plaintiff 2.42  
The same advantage applies to forward-looking reductions 
as well: What if Plaintiff 1’s punitive damages are preemp-
tively reduced (as some courts have done)43 due to a worry 
that future plaintiffs might also sue—but then it turns out that 
no other plaintiffs come forward? Again, using concurrent 
damages can avoid the problem of remittitur regret. 
A closely related advantage is that the concurrence approach 
takes the profit out of manipulative gaming of the system (by 
either side). As a foil, consider those states that have adopted a 
first-come, first-served approach, barring punitive awards be-
yond the first case that awards them.44 The opportunities for 
gaming by defendants are self-evident: litigating against the 
weakest plaintiff first, forum shopping, and so forth. The con-
currence approach eliminates such incentives for manipula-
tion, both because it requires each court to declare the full 
amount of the proper punitive award and because, crucially, 
the defendant will always end up having to pay the highest 
	
42 An alternative approach of reducing or offsetting a later punitive award 
by the amount of earlier awards could in theory share this advantage, if in 
operation the credit for an earlier award could be revoked as needed. 
43 One such example is Judge Friendly’s case. See Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838–44 (2d Cir. 1967). Again, Minnesota’s puni-
tive damages statute also invites such speculative, anticipatory reduction. 
See supra note 40.	
44 Florida is a leading example. See supra note 41. Other states have re-
sisted this approach. See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 
976 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. 1998) (“[I]t would be unfair to this plaintiff to bar 
his claim for punitive damages just because other plaintiffs have previously 
recovered damages arising out of the same conduct.”). 	
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formal amount.45 In a parallel way, if anticipatory concurrence 
is known to be available, its general use can avoid the sort of 
racing to the courthouse by plaintiffs that is likely to occur un-
der those alternative solutions that favor the first plaintiff 
(such as offsets or bars on later awards).46 
3. Complementing Preclusion Law 
The law of preclusion does not solve the redundant punitive 
damages problem. To the contrary—nonmutual offensive col-
lateral estoppel, as endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,47 potentially allows Plaintiff 2 to 
	
45 Note that this advantage is shared by the “offset” approach adopted in 
a handful of states. See infra note 46.	
46 For an example of an offset policy, see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.263(4) (2000), 
which describes an offset system whereby a later punitive damages award 
is reduced by the amount of a prior punitive damages award. Notably, this 
Missouri statute generated a dispute over how to apply the offset when two 
cases proceeded at roughly the same time and their sequencing became 
tangled. See Barnett v. La Societe Anonyme Turbomeca, 963 S.W.2d. 639, 
653–54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Other states with an offset system include 
Oklahoma and Oregon. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 9.1(C)(2) (West 2011) 
(providing that the “[t]rial court shall reduce any award for punitive dam-
ages” by the amount of punitive damages the defendant has previously 
paid); Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.730(3) (2013) (“In reducing awards of punitive 
damages . . . the court shall consider the amount of any previous judgment 
for punitive damages entered against the same defendant for the same con-
duct giving rise to a claim for punitive damages.”). Some states allow pre-
vious awards to be considered in assessing a new award. See Gagnon v. 
Continental Cas. Co., 260 Cal. Rptr. 305, 306–07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (noting 
that “whether punitive damages previously have been imposed for the 
same conduct” is a relevant consideration in deciding the amount of a puni-
tive damage award); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 
35, 38 (Tex. 1998) (“[E]vidence about . . . previously paid punitive damage 
awards . . . for the same course of conduct is relevant and may be admitted 
when a defendant offers it to mitigate punitive damages.”).	
47 439 U.S. 322, 329–31 (1979) (upholding federal court’s application of 
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel, in its discretion, while also articu-
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piggyback on Plaintiff 1’s victory.48 Asymmetrically, however, 
the defendant cannot make use of Plaintiff 1’s victory and 
windfall against Plaintiff 2.49 (Nor could it use Plaintiff 1’s 
loss.) This may all be quite sensible as far as the law of preclu-
sion goes. But the asymmetry feeds the repetitive damages 
problem by encouraging piggybacking by Plaintiff 2, Plaintiff 
3, and so forth. The use of concurrent punitive damages rebal-
ances this asymmetry by deflating the incentives to pile on, 
and, more generally, by reducing redundancy in the awards 
that might result. 
Another preclusion device sometimes touted as a potential 
solution—the mandatory punitive damages class action—has 
yet to prove palatable to the courts,50 and the outlook is not 
	
lating factors to be considered by the courts in exercising this discretion). 
Note that the Parklane factors tend not to be especially useful for counseling 
a court against applying preclusion in the context of redundant punitive 
damages. For instance, although one factor is whether plaintiffs are likely to 
take advantage of the availability of preclusion by waiting until another 
plaintiff wins, such a strategy seems unlikely for plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages—who, if anything, may tend to race to the courthouse instead. See 
id. at 330 (describing the “wait and see” criterion). Similarly, the worry that 
the “defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages” 
and may thus have “little incentive to defend vigorously” seems plainly ir-
relevant in cases involving punitive damages. Id. 	
48 Likewise, the same phenomenon may occur in the many states that also 
permit nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Tofany v. NBS 
Imaging Sys., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ind. 1993) (endorsing the use of non-
mutual offensive collateral estoppel); Falgren v. Bd. of Teaching, 545 
N.W.2d 901, 907–08 (Minn. 1996) (same); In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 
914 (Mo. 1997) (same); Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 384 (N.M. 1987) (same); 
Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1984) (same).	
49 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008) (noting that, generally, 
nonparties cannot be bound by the preclusive effect of past judgments or 
findings, except under limited conditions). 	
50 For now, the one shining example, in the case of the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill, remains an anomaly. See Linda S. Mullenix, Nine Lives: The Punitive 
Damages Class, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 845, 863–67 (2010) (recognizing the Exxon 
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promising.51 And of course, it cannot be a general solution, be-
cause many redundant punitive damages situations are un-
suitable for the class action form. One might then suppose that 
non-class aggregation—such as consolidation—may be able to 
do some good, but that approach depends on whether the 
cases are all located in the same state or are removable to (or 
already within) the federal system.52 Concurrence, by contrast, 
is used by a court unilaterally53—and does not depend on any 
such happenstance of procedural alignment with other cases. 
A deeper problem remains, anyway, in relying on aggrega-
tion devices (including non-class forms): There is no guarantee 
that aggregated proceedings will result in lower awards than 
in separately tried cases. True, there may be some natural 
compression when a single court deals out the punitive dam-
	
Valdez case to be a unique instance of the mandatory punitive damages 
class). The Exxon Valdez example is also anomalous in that punitive dam-
ages were barred in parallel state court litigation based on “deference to 
[the] federal court order creating a federal mandatory punitive damages 
class.” Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 775 (Alaska 1999). 
There is no general guarantee, of course, that any future court would defer 
to another in this way.	
51 See In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 134–36 (2d Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
District Judge Jack Weinstein’s attempt to certify a mandatory punitive 
damages class using a “limited punishment” theory). Given the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s recent habit of raising the bar for class certification at almost 
every turn, the prospects for class-action solutions to the redundant puni-
tive damages problem appear grim.	
52 Moreover, consolidation can bring together only cases that are already 
pending; when claims arise over time, it is easy to imagine situations where 
“consolidation would not prevent multiple punitive damages awards.” 
Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing 
the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 62 
n.141 (1983).	
53 The tradeoff entailed by the unilateral nature of the use of concurrence 
is, of course, that earlier and later courts addressing the same conduct by 
the same defendant might nonetheless disagree about whether (and to what 
extent) concurrence should be used. See supra Subsection I.A.3. 	
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ages for many plaintiffs at once.54 But think of juries calculat-
ing punitive damages by applying a multiplier to compensa-
tory damages; the sum total punitive amount would be the 
same whether the cases were aggregated or tried one by one. 
This is where a concurrence option can be crucial, allowing the 
compression to happen as the court deems appropriate. To be 
clear, concurrence can work in the absence of aggregation—the 
point here is that concurrence may in fact be needed for aggre-
gation to do any real work at all. 
	
54 For instance, a deterrence-focused court that would have assessed a 
higher  multiplier (1/P) in a single-plaintiff case might, in an aggregated 
case, recognize that P is in fact higher (and hence the proper multiplier 
should be lower).	
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II. HYPER-ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY DAMAGES 
Damages of at least $750 per song;55 at least $1000 per unau-
thorized login;56 at least $5500 per false invoice57; and at least 
$10,000 per wiretap58—the high dollar ranges often found in 
statutory damages provisions carry an unmistakable in ter-
rorem message. One might understand the not-so-subtle warn-
ing as: “Even if you think your chances of getting caught are 
low, penalties like these make it not worth the risk.” One 
might also perceive a message aimed at potential plaintiffs: 
“Penalties like these make it worth your while to sue.”59 
Both messages reflect aims that are said to motivate the use 
of minimum awards in statutory damages schemes: respec-
	
55 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012) (providing a standard 
range of $750 to $30,000 per work, if the infringements are not willful). 	
56 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Title II, or the Stored Commu-
nications Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2707(c) (2012) (“[I]n no case shall a person enti-
tled to recover receive less than the sum of $1,000.”). As glossed by the 
courts, this is calculated as a per-intrusion amount. See Pure Power Boot 
Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC, 759 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428–29 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 355 B.R. 225, 232 (D. Haw. 
2006). The nuances of the courts’ interpretations of this provision are dis-
cussed in Subsection II.A.1  of my earlier article. See Huang, supra note 8, at 
747-50.	
57 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006) (mandating “a civil penalty 
of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000”). This range, currently 
adjusted for inflation, is $5,500 to $11,000. 	
58 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Title III, or the Wiretap Act), 
18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(B) (2012) (mandating “statutory damages of which-
ever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000”).	
59 See, e.g., Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t, 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(noting that minimum statutory damages in the Cable Act are intended “to 
encourage the filing of individual lawsuits . . . often because there would 
otherwise be no incentive to bring an individual claim”); see also infra note 
62.	
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tively, deterrence and inducing litigation.60 Each aim is vulner-
able, however, to what we might call the problem of “hyper-
enforcement”: when the levels of enforcement (or the chances 
of proving liability) turn out to be higher than anticipated in 
the statutory design, leading to overdeterrence in expectation 
and possibly to surprisingly punitive levels of damages.61 This 
Part considers each vulnerability in turn, explaining how the 
notions of “fixed” and “variable” damages map onto each 
problem—and how the procedural device of running damages 
concurrently can be used to solve it. 
A. Redundant Inducements to Sue 
The high per-count ranges or minimums in certain statutory 
damages provisions are said to have the purpose of “en-
courag[ing] the prosecution of cases that would otherwise be 
	
60 The messages also interact, of course, not least in suggesting to defen-
dants that plaintiffs are likely to sue—thus giving more force to the deter-
rent effect.	
61 Note that even the statutory damages schemes that include amplified 
ranges of per-count awards (such as for “willful” or more egregious behav-
ior)—and thus have a punitive flavor—can reach “surprisingly” punitive 
levels if those ranges are set based on predictions of a lower probability of 
successful enforcement than turns out to be true. More generally, it has not 
gone unnoticed that statutory damages may acquire a punitive effect. See 
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright 
Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 462 (2009) 
(“Even when judges or juries do not explicitly say they are intent on pun-
ishing defendants, the [statutory damages] awards they sometimes make 
are punitive in effect.”). In practice, however, whether they have such a pu-
nitive effect may have little or no effect on appellate review, as long as the 
damages remain within the statutory limits. See 4 Melville B. Nimmer & 
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04(B)(1)(a) (2009) (“Although 
the standards enunciated for awarding statutory damages run from ap-
proval of a punitive approach to disapproval of punishment, those stan-
dards are largely precatory; as long as the district court acts within the pre-
scribed statutory limits, its discretion will probably be upheld on appeal.”). 	
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too costly for an individual plaintiff to pursue.”62 That is, the 
minimum award per count is artificially inflated to include an 
inducement to bring suit. The problem with this system is self-
evident: Ideally, such a bonus for inducing suit would not be 
embedded in the per-count award, but rather take the form of a 
fixed per-case subsidy. Yet in reality the per-count bonus re-
mains typical of statutory damages schemes.63 
Embedded in each statutory award, then, is a bonus to in-
duce litigation that should not be automatically repeated with 
every further count. Whatever the level of the desired litigation 
subsidy, it is a “fixed” and not a “variable” component of the 
damages in a given enforcement action.64 With more and more 
	
62 Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t, 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); 
accord Parker, 331 F.3d at 22 (noting that, in a Cable Act case, minimum per-
customer statutory damages are imposed “usually in order to encourage 
the filing of individual lawsuits”); see also Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. 
Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that the Copyright Act’s “statutory 
damages ranges likely include some amount to compensate copyright own-
ers for the costs entailed in investigating and detecting infringing behav-
ior,” and citing a report of the Register of Copyrights, which noted the aim 
of ensuring recovery adequate “to warrant the expense of detecting in-
fringements”); Forman v. Data Transfer Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (noting that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s statutory dam-
ages minimum of $500 per violation “is designed to provide adequate in-
centive for an individual plaintiff to bring suit on his own behalf”).	
63 The problems with the linearity of per-count award schemes may sim-
ply have escaped the attention of the drafters of some such statutes. In the 
case of the Copyright Act, the drafters appear to have dismissed the possi-
bility out of hand: “We believe that the danger of exorbitant awards in mul-
tiple infringement cases is more theoretical than real. . . . We know of no 
case where the resulting total was considered excessive.” General Revision 
of the U.S. Copyright Laws, 3 Omnibus Copyright Revision History 105 
(George S. Grossman ed., 2001). 	
64 The analysis offered here can easily be adapted to situations in which 
the desired litigation subsidy increases (though not linearly) with the num-
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counts, as the artificially inflated per-count awards stack up, 
any need for further encouragement evaporates.65 In cases with 
a large number of counts, moreover, such stacking-up will rap-
idly outstrip the ideal level of damages and reach heights fairly 
described as “surprisingly punitive.” See Figure 1. 
The best known variation of this hyper-enforcement prob-
lem occurs when class actions are brought seeking statutory 
damages for each of thousands or even millions of total 
counts.66 Most famous may be the proposed class of 12 million 
Time Warner customers—in a case about disclosure of cus-
tomer information—in which the statutory minimum of $1000 
per count would imply a minimum of $12 billion in damages.67 
Or consider the potentially $1.9 billion in statutory damages 
claimed against Chuck E. Cheese for a technical violation in the 
printing of millions of customer receipts.68 
	
ber of plaintiffs or violations. But for exposition’s sake, the implicit assump-
tion is that the desired inducement subsidy is fixed per case.	
65 One potential complication here is that in some cases it may take multi-
ple counts’ worth of accumulated bonuses before reaching the supposedly 
desired level of litigation subsidy; if so, it is only after such a threshold is 
met that the further litigation bonuses become redundant. 	
66 For a collection of cases, see Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgot-
ten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 
103, 105–06 (2009). 	
67 See Parker, 331 F.3d 13. The assumption running throughout the follow-
ing analysis, perhaps a debatable one, is that the $1000 minimum is more 
than the true harm to each victim (of the unacknowledged disclosures)—so 
that not all of it is properly considered “variable” in our conceptual frame-
work. Were this amount deemed to be entirely a “variable” component, of 
course, then there would be no cause for concern, and a court could simply 
forgo the use of concurrence in such a case. 	
68 Blanco v. CEC Entm’t Concepts L.P., No. CV 07-0559 GPS (JWJx), 2008 
WL 239658 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). This and other startling cases under the 
federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, as well as the rather 
weak Congressional response to such cases (namely, creating a grace period 
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What is wrong here, observers typically say, is that such a 
litigation bonus becomes extraneous when the class action de-
vice is available as an alternative solution to the problem of en-
forcing small individual claims.69 As a leading commentator 
neatly put it, the standard worry is “that class treatment would 
turn the per-customer statutory damages . . . into a hammer so 
heavy as to be beyond any plausible account of the underlying 
remedial scheme . . . [b]ecause Congress already had set the 
remedial scheme to make claims worthwhile on a disaggre-
gated basis.”70 
But that cannot be the whole problem. After all, it is not 
multi-party aggregation per se that is driving the surprisingly 
punitive amount at stake. Rather, the driver is simply the huge 
	
for a narrow category of non-willful violations), are discussed in Scheuer-
man, supra note 66, at 105–06 & n.11. 	
69 See, e.g., Parker, 331 F.3d at 22 (“We acknowledge Judge Glasser’s le-
gitimate concern that the potential for a devastatingly large damages 
award, out of all reasonable proportion to the actual harm suffered by 
members of the plaintiff class, may raise due process issues. Those issues 
arise from the effects of combining a statutory scheme that imposes mini-
mum statutory damages awards on a per-consumer basis—usually in order 
to encourage the filing of individual lawsuits as a means of private en-
forcement of consumer protection laws—with the class action mechanism 
that aggregates many claims—often because there would otherwise be no 
incentive to bring an individual claim.”).	
70 Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settle-
ment Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 
1872, 1903 (2006) (discussing Parker, 331 F.3d 13); see also Stephen B. Bur-
bank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of 
Shady Grove, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17, 73–74 (2010) (discussing tension between 
“the possibility of crushing aggregate penalties” and “providing remedies 
that will induce individual enforcement”); J. Maria Glover, The Structural 
Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1137, 1191–92 (2012) (noting possible “remedial overkill”); cf. Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., v. Allstate Ins., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1472 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (analogizing class action limitation to damages 
cap). 	
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number of counts. And a large number of counts is possible 
even when there is only a single plaintiff. Thus, even if the 
class-action difficulty can be averted, say, by a refusal to certify 
such a class, the general problem does not go away so easily. 
A more general solution may be possible, however. In both 
the single-plaintiff scenario and the class action variant, a con-
current damages option can be used to counteract such exces-
sive piling-on of the litigation bonus. There are at least two 
ways to use concurrent damages here.71 First, taking a cruder 
approach, a court can truncate the accumulation of damages 
(beyond a certain desired level of total award) by running any 
further counts concurrently.  
Second, taking a more conceptually precise approach, the 
court can designate a fraction of each count’s award as repre-
senting the “variable” component—for instance, reflecting the 
harm done by each count. The remaining fraction of each 
award would then be counted toward the litigation subsidy; 
thus, for any counts beyond those needed to reach the desired 
level of subsidy, the court would run those portions concur-
rently. See Figure 2. After that point, only the variable portion 
of each award would be allowed to accumulate for each fur-
ther count, and properly so.72 
	
71 Either way, in the class action variant of the problem, the properly con-
tained amount would then be allocated among the class. 	
72 As is evident from comparing Figures 1 and 2, the approach described 
here creates a damages curve lying between the subsidized harm curve and 
the unsubsidized harm curve  (and parallel to both). A court wishing in-
stead to approximate the subsidized harm curve can do so simply by allow-
ing more per-count subsidies to accumulate first (in effect, following the 
statutory damages curve until it meets the subsidized harm curve in Figure 
1, before starting to run concurrently any further per-count subsidies). In 
theory, a court can also approximate the unsubsidized harm curve while 
taking advantage of the per-count subsidies—though such a path is proba-
bly too complicated to be attractive in practice (namely, following the statu-
tory damages curve until reaching the level of desired subsidy, then flat-
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
34    
B. More Counts, More Enforcement? 
A more general problem of hyper-enforcement can occur 
when statutory damages are understood to serve deterrence.73 
In copyright, for example, statutory damages are said to serve 
not only to compensate but also to “discourage wrongful con-
duct”;74 they “furnish the deterrence . . . necessary for prospec-
tive infringers.”75 For trademark violations, they are aimed 
partly at compensation and partly “at deterrence of future 
counterfeiting—both by the bad actor in question and by other 
potential counterfeiters.”76 Notably, some statements suggest 
that the statutory penalties are inflated because the real or per-
ceived probability of being penalized is low. For example, leg-
	
lining by running entire per-count awards concurrently, before proceeding 
up the unsubsidized harm curve once it surpasses the level of desired sub-
sidy). 
73 The following exposition will speak in terms of optimal deterrence, but 
the main points are easily translatable to absolute deterrence (by substitut-
ing gains for harms, as the touchstone). 	
74 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 
(1952).	
75 Staff of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Copyright Law Revision, 
Studies 22–25, at 9 (Comm. Print 1960). These studies are taken as legisla-
tive history for the Copyright Act of 1976. See also Staff of H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 87th Cong., Rep. of the Register of Copyrights on the General Re-
vision of the U.S. Copyright Law 103 (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3 
Omnibus Copyright Revision Legislative History (George S. Grossman ed., 
1976) (“[S]tatutory damages are intended (1) to assure adequate compensa-
tion . . . and (2) to deter infringement.”).	
76 Stark Carpet Corp. v. Stark Carpet & Flooring Installations Corp., 954 
F. Supp. 2d 145, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Burberry Ltd. v. Euro Moda, 
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5781 (CM) (AJP), 2009 WL 4432678, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 
2009) (observing that the award should operate “to discourage further 
wrongdoing by the defendant and others”); Staff of H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, supra note 75,  at 156 (noting that the award “will serve both as a spe-
cific deterrent for Defendant and a general deterrent for others contemplat-
ing the infringement of valid trademarks”).	
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islative history accompanying an enhancement to the statutory 
damages provisions of the Copyright Act expressly noted, 
about downloading and file-sharing, that “[m]any computer 
users . . . simply believe that they will not be caught or prose-
cuted for their conduct” and that thus “more stringent deter-
rents” were needed.77 
One might thus view the high dollar awards specified in 
some statutes as making up for presumptively low probabili-
ties of detection, litigation, or proof.78 (This aim has also been 
recognized, of course, as one purpose served by punitive dam-
ages.79) But what if the resulting statutory awards ranges are 
	
77 H.R. Rep. No. 106-216, at 2–3 (1999) (explaining the purpose of House 
Bill 1761, which became part of the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright 
Damages Improvement Act of 1999). For an analysis of file-sharing liability 
in light of the Copyright Act’s history, see Peter S. Menell, In Search of 
Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute in the Internet 
Age, 59 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 1 (2011). 	
78 See, e.g., Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 355–56 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(explaining that the Truth-in-Lending Act provision awarding plaintiff ac-
tual damages plus twice the finance charge of the loan, and all attorney and 
court costs, is “designed to deter generally illegalities which are only rarely 
uncovered and punished”); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. LY USA, No. 06 
Civ. 13463(AKH), 2008 WL 5637161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2008) (explaining 
that statutory damages are useful when counterfeiters’ records are “non-
existent, inadequate or deceptively kept in order to willfully deflate the 
level of counterfeiting activity actually engaged in, making proving actual 
damages in these cases extremely difficult if not impossible”). For a fuller 
discussion of the variety of reasons for enhancing damages to compensate 
for a low probability of sanction, see Sharkey, supra note 4, at 366–67. For 
an economic analysis, see Keith Hylton & Thomas Miceli, Should Tort 
Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 388 (2005). 	
79 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (noting that 
“[a] higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to 
detect”).	
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based on assumptions of low enforcement—and yet actual en-
forcement turns out to be higher?80 
The following analysis focuses on one intuitive but tricky 
form of this problem: when the probability of successful en-
forcement increases with the number of violations.81 It is easy 
to imagine why this may occur. Private enforcers may be more 
motivated to pursue cases with higher counts and thus higher 
potential winnings.82 Some public enforcers may also act this 
way.83 More mechanically, monitoring by both private and 
	
80 The general problem of setting deterrence multipliers when enforce-
ment probabilities can change (such as based on the salience or seriousness 
of the offense) is thoroughly examined in Richard Craswell, Deterrence and 
Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 
2185 (1999). 	
81 What makes this variant of the problem more difficult is that the seem-
ingly direct approach—adjusting the statutory minimum up or down—is 
not a well-tailored solution to the problem of variation in probabilities from 
case to case.	
82 Class actions, of course, are the archetype of this phenomenon. Punitive 
damages are also seen as motivating for plaintiffs in a similar way. See, e.g., 
Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-
Measured Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 846–47 (1989) (“In some cases 
damages may be so limited that the citizen who considers suing is discour-
aged from doing so, even though a suit would be socially useful. . . . The 
potential of a punitive award may make a claim worthwhile that otherwise 
would not be.”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: 
An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 895 (1998) (explaining that 
punitive damages, by incentivizing suits, decrease the chances that a de-
fendant will escape liability).	
83 Joint public-private enforcement also occurs in some contexts, such as in 
qui tam litigation under the False Claims Act. See David Freeman Eng-
strom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam 
Litigation, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1244 (2012) (empirically assessing qui tam 
litigation). For evidence that public enforcers differentiate between larger 
and smaller targets in their likelihood of pursuing enforcement, see, e.g., 
Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from En-
forcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 Bus. Law. 679, 682, 685 (2012). 	
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public enforcers may be more likely to detect actors who en-
gage in multiple violations—and likewise, proof of wrongdo-
ing may be easier to establish.84 
The device of concurrent damages can be used to neutralize 
the extra multiplier for expected damages caused by such in-
creases in the probability of successful enforcement. (It should 
be emphasized that the use of concurrence does not imply un-
dercompensating plaintiffs. Recall that the awards are as-
sumed to be already inflated beyond actual harm, by design; 
the use of concurrence in effect adjusts the degree of that infla-
tion.) 
To illustrate, think of a fast-flowing river, and assume that 
each discharge of pollutants by a factory causes the same 
amount of harm. For instance, each successive discharge may 
contaminate the river water in essentially the same way—say, 
temporarily raising the concentration of contaminants from 
zero to a certain amount. Now consider two factories, each dis-
charging ten times (and thus their activities are equally harm-
ful) in its own river. Factory 1 does so over the course of one 
day. Factory 2 does so once a day for ten days. It is easy to 
imagine how the chance of detection for Factory 2 could be 
higher than for Factory 1; indeed, the probability may well be 
ten times higher. This would be the case, for instance, if the en-
forcer monitors by auditing, randomly choosing one day a 
month to observe water quality in a given river.85 
	
84 Moreover, a rise in expected per-count penalties may increase with N 
(the number of counts) for other reasons. For example, proving a higher N 
may also raise the chance of proving the behavior to be willful or know-
ing—thus triggering further statutory multipliers, such as treble damages. 
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (increased maximum under the Copy-
right Act); 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (2006) (treble damages under the Telephone 
Consumer Protection Act). 	
85 This auditing method is constructed so that the probability of detection 
for each factory can be calculated simply as the ratio (number of days in 
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Assume that discovery of any single discharge leads to the 
eventual revelation of each factory’s complete polluting behav-
ior.86 The expected penalty internalized by Factory 2 would 
thus be ten times greater than for Factory 1, even though for 
optimal deterrence they should be internalizing the (same) to-
tal harm they each cause.87 If the statutory penalty is appropri-
ately set for deterring Factory 1, then it is ten times too large 
for Factory 2. 
	
which any discharge occurs/number of days in the month). This simplifica-
tion is for exposition’s sake, and of course other relationships between the 
number of counts and the probability of enforcement are possible. For 
variations, including the more difficult problem when the probability in-
creases faster than proportionally with the increase in counts, see infra note 
95, .	
86 One judge has noticed such a problem in the context of the Copyright 
Act:  
However, the Copyright Act does not contain a provision to correct 
for the fact that once a recording company has decided to devote the 
resources necessary to detect one act of infringement by a file sharer, 
the marginal cost of detecting additional acts of infringement is likely 
low since the investigation of the file sharer’s account on a peer-to-
peer network will generally reveal a treasure trove of unlawfully 
downloaded works. As a result, the imposition of statutory damages 
in file-sharing cases where multiple copyrighted works have been in-
fringed can produce awards much greater than necessary to provide 
copyright owners with an adequate incentive to investigate and detect 
infringement.  
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 115 (D. Mass. 
2010) (Gertner, J.). 	
87 The assumption, as before, is that the penalty is applied to each dis-
charge separately if they occur on the same day. This is the reading courts 
have given to the Clean Water Act’s damages under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) 
(2006). See Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 
817–18 (2001) (interpreting “per day for each violation” under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(d)). 	
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Consider now Factory 3, which discharges only once—say, 
on the first day.88 Factory 2 causes ten times as much harm as 
Factory 3, and yet its expected penalty is one hundred times 
higher (because its probability of detection is also ten times 
higher). As before, Factory 2’s penalty needs to be compressed 
by a factor of ten. This contrast between Factory 2 and Factory 
3 sets in sharp relief the difficulty for any court trying to articu-
late the reason for compressing Factory 2’s damages,89 if it 
were to do so by directly reducing the per-count award. 
Imagine what the court would have to say: “The award per 
discharge for the factory with ten violations should be lower 
than for the factory that did it only once—and in fact, it should 
be only one-tenth as large.” It may well be possible for the 
court to explain this (logically sound) discount, but the seem-
ing injustice of it may remain a practical obstacle. 
1. Using Concurrent Damages 
The option of running damages concurrently offers an alter-
native way to compensate for the extra multiplier on expected 
damages, due to a higher probability of enforcement, in cases 
where the statutory award range was set assuming a lower 
probability.90 It is especially useful when a minimum statutory 
award precludes lowering the per-count award directly, of 
course, but it is also useful when such an artificial adjustment 
is undesirable even if the range would allow it.91 
	
88 Thus Factory 3, like Factory 1, faces accurate incentives from the opti-
mal deterrence perspective.	
89 Doing so would be tricky in either an opinion or jury instructions.	
90 The order-of-magnitude errors that are possible are not easy to accept 
as “rough justice,” even if the probabilities at issue are knowable only as 
rough approximations.	
91 The potential disadvantages of such “artificial averaging” or fictional 
pricing are explored in my earlier article. See Huang, supra note 8, at 738–
41. 	
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
40    
To see its application in the case of the three factories, as-
sume as before that the statutory per-count award is set ap-
propriately for Factories 1 and 3 (that is, it is inflated to ac-
count for their low chances of being sanctioned). For Factory 2, 
then, the court would recognize the ten counts, one for each 
discharge—but run them all concurrently. On this illustration’s 
assumptions, such a compression exactly adjusts for the extra 
multiplier due to this polluter’s higher probability of detection. 
The use of concurrence can be readily generalized (beyond 
such a stylized illustration) through the careful application of 
our conceptual framework of “fixed” and “variable” portions 
of damages. The key is understanding these components to be 
responsive to the probabilities of successful enforcement. As 
the probability increases, the “variable” component of each 
award diminishes (for the simple reason that there is less of a 
need for the artificial per-count boost meant to make up for 
low probabilities). Thus, in the case of Factory 2, the “variable” 
component is one-tenth of each award, rather than the full 
award; only that fraction should be repeated for each of the ten 
counts. In essence, then, the court is running the remaining 
nine-tenths of each per-count award concurrently with all 
other awards.92 This is the more conceptually precise—and 
more generalizable—way of understanding what is described 
in the simplified illustration above as running all the counts 
concurrently. 
2. Enforcement Motivations 
One further intuitive and possibly more realistic variation 
should be addressed: What if the reason for the increase in 
probability is partly motivational—say, because the enforcer is 
	
92 The similarity should thus be quite apparent between this usage and the 
use of anticipatory concurrence in the punitive damages setting, as de-
scribed in Subsection I.A.3. 	
 DRAFT – AUG. 2014 
   41 
more likely to pursue a case with a larger potential recovery?93 
Consider a Factory 4 that discharges on five separate days, 
twice a day. It thus faces a five times greater chance of being 
caught in an audit than Factory 3. Suppose further that, upon 
detection, the enforcer is twice as likely to pursue a “large” 
case (say, one with a potential recovery of at least ten times the 
single-discharge award). Factory 4 therefore faces a ten times 
higher chance of sanction than Factory 3. But now the needed 
compression is no longer achieved by running all ten counts 
concurrently (unlike for Factory 2). Rather, it is achieved by 
running the ten counts concurrently as two awards (compress-
ing by a factor of five)—which if anticipated by the enforcer 
would lead to a further reduction in the chance of enforcement 
(by a factor of two), thereby resulting in the correct degree of 
deterrence.94  
Notice how the use of concurrent damages would properly 
deflate the motivation to enforce, whether the exaggeration 
factor is two (as above) or some other number X. This mecha-
nism implies that the court faces conveniently low information 
demands: To achieve proper deterrence, nothing had to be 
known about how much the enforcer’s motivation might be 
exaggerated by the size of the award. The reason is simply that 
the concurrent damages option is used to reach the accurate 
	
93 An analogous story can be told in which the enforcer is more likely to 
audit in the first place, when it knows that there is bigger game to be 
caught.	
94 The question arises whether this shift from more to less avid enforce-
ment is a good thing. The answer necessarily varies by context, of course. 
One might argue, for instance, that it is good for public enforcers (because 
of savings to the fisc) but bad for private enforcers (from the ex post per-
spective, as some would not pursue compensation). For an analysis sug-
gesting that costly private enforcement, induced by high potential dam-
ages, can be welfare-reducing, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Li-
ability, 17 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1988). 	
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award; consequently, any amount of an enforcer’s extra moti-
vation from anticipating a further windfall would be deflated 
just by bringing the award down to size.95 
CONCLUSION: ON ACOUSTIC SEPARATION 
Consider the following thought experiment, which over-
turns a central assumption of the preceding analysis: What if 
the excessive damages described thus far are not unexpected 
or unintended but instead are purposeful messages aimed at 
deterring a class of overconfident actors who misperceive their 
chances of escaping liability as better than they actually are? 
Up to now, it has been assumed that violators know when 
their probability of liability is low and when it is high. But 
their perceptions may not be correct. What if they are overcon-
fident about getting away with their misconduct? For deter-
rence purposes, it may be better for such overconfident actors 
not to know that concurrence may be used, even if will be.96 
	
95 Several technical notes are in order. It is probably too far a stretch to 
think that the following variations could be identified by the court in any 
real case (beyond the simplest kind of rough proportionality suggested in 
the text), but they are worth noting for the sake of completeness. First, what 
if P increases more slowly than N? If the chance of enforcement increases 
(1/F) times as fast as N, then the N concurrence awards should be run con-
currently as F awards. Second, what if P increases faster than N? If it is not 
possible to run N awards concurrently as a fraction of an award, then con-
currence can only partially adjust toward the accurate multiplier (unless 
there is the dual mechanism at work, as noted above). Finally, what hap-
pens when P reaches 1, at a high enough N? The court should no longer in-
crease its compression beyond that point, of course. This seems an unlikely 
concern in many relevant contexts, as the chance of enforcement is not often 
one hundred percent. 	
96 Recall the story of Factory 2 by the river, discharging on ten different 
days. Its expected damages are inflated by a factor of ten because the prob-
ability of detection increases with the number of days of discharge (and the 
polluter knows it). What if instead this polluter does not anticipate that dis-
charging on more days entails a greater chance of being caught? Precisely 
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And if all violators were overconfident in this way, then there 
might be no use for concurrence. 
But the problem is the existence of other actors who have 
more accurate perceptions. For them, believing that concur-
rence can and will be used is what prevents overdeterrence.97 
This tension forces a tradeoff for the legal designer deciding 
whether to include a concurrence option, and for the court de-
ciding whether to apply it. Should concurrent damages be 
used, thus underdeterring the overoptimists—or not, thus 
overdeterring the realists? Should concurrence be used, but the 
damages range increased somewhat, as a compromise ap-
proach? Should concurrence be forgone, but the damages 
range decreased? 
A release from this dilemma may be possible when there is 
“acoustic separation” in a concurrent damages regime; that is, 
when the availability of concurrent damages is not salient to 
some potential violators, due to their naivety about the legal 
system.98 It then becomes possible to decouple what the over-
optimists expect (a harsh damages regime) from what the real-
	
because it misperceives its own chances of enforcement, this polluter ends up 
correctly deterred; in a sense, the relentless linearity of the damages sched-
ule offsets overoptimism about evading detection. 	
97 Seeing the inflated statutory damages imposed without concurrence, as 
suggested for the overoptimist’s case, would have an overdeterring effect 
on these more realistic actors. Perhaps in a few cases it may be easy for such 
a realistic actor to recognize that concurrence was forgone in a prior case 
because the earlier actor was an overoptimistic type (for example, a sea-
soned illegal infringer of copyrighted music might see the defendants in the 
Sony and Capitol Records end-user downloading cases as naïve and over-
optimistic). See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th 
Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, Civ. No. 07-11446-RWZ, 
2012 WL 3639053 (D. Mass. Aug. 23, 2012). But generally, what happens in 
prior cases probably casts a shadow for future actors in a more generic way. 	
98 The concept of “acoustic separation” is introduced in Meir Dan-Cohen, 
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal 
Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984). 
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ists expect (the potential use of concurrence)—if the overopti-
mists tend also to be more naïve about how damages are actu-
ally applied.99 
But that is a big “if.” The correlation is presumably positive 
in some contexts; those who are naïve about how damages are 
assessed might tend to overlap with those who are unaware of 
the real chances of enforcement. Still, poor overlap in a given 
context would weaken the case for such decoupling through 
acoustic separation. And in a plausible sort of reversed situa-
tion, with the sophisticates thinking they can elude detection, 
acoustic separation should be actively avoided: These sophisti-
cates need to know that concurrence will be properly forgone 
in their cases, while the naïve need to be told that concurrence 




99 A similar logic applies to overoptimism of other sorts—such as about 
the harm that may be done. For instance, in the statutory damages context, 
if an overoptimist mistakenly thinks that she will not cause much harm 
(and that therefore she will not be liable for much in damages), then the 
harsh message of a linear statutory damages scheme may be just what she 
needs to hear. It is an especially accurate message if she thinks her harms 
are marginally diminishing, when in fact they do add up linearly. (In the 
reverse situation, with the actor thinking her harms are linear when in fact 
they are marginally diminishing, the court should use concurrence ex post—
and make this practice widely known ex ante. That is, acoustic separation 
should be actively avoided.) For a fuller discussion of “diminishing mar-
ginal harm,” see Huang, supra note 8, at 730–35. Likewise, overoptimism 
about gains may also be counteracted through such decoupling, if the aim is 
absolute deterrence. In the case of gains, the information demands on the 
court may seem unusual: How could a court have a more accurate sense of 
the gains curve than the violator? For further analysis, see A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the 
Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. Econ. & Org. 427 (1994) (discuss-
ing costs of legal error under each approach). 	
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